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1Abstract
We present a theory of vehicle choice where utility depends on the vehicle choices
made by other consumers. We use parameters from current transportation and public
safety data to show that changes in motor vehicle policy may have unexpectedly large
or non-existent effects on safety or ﬂeet mix.
1 Introduction
Empirical evidence (Gayer (2004), White (2002)) suggests that drivers of sport-
utility vehicles (SUVs) and light truck drivers are less likely to die in multi-vehicle
collisions than drivers of traditional cars. This increased safety of driving an SUV
or light truck – from a driver’s perspective – is well known to consumers. There
is considerable anecdotal evidence that many consumers choose to buy SUVs and
light trucks because they “feel safe” driving them. This phenomenon is known as
defensive purchasing. However, econometric studies also suggest that SUV drivers
are more likely than car drivers to kill the occupants of other vehicles involved in
multi-vehicle collisions. Thus, by purchasing an SUV or light truck, a driver improves
her own expected level of safety, but increases the risk to other motorists of dying
or being seriously injured in a crash. Moreover, the externality from SUV driving
shows increasing returns: the greater the proportion of SUVs on the road, the greater
the likelihood of their involvement in collisions, and thus the greater the externality
imposed by them.
In this paper, we present a theory of vehicle choice where each consumer’s utility
depends not only on preferences for the quality attributes of vehicles, but also on
the vehicle choices made by other consumers. We then use parameters from current
transportation and public safety data to analyze the implications of changes in motor
vehicle policy for the mix of vehicles on the road and public safety.
In our theoretical model, the equilibrium ﬂeet mix depends on each consumer’s
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conomic literature, but to the best of our knowledge has not been applied previously
to an externality problem in environmental economics. We show that in this kind
of system, there are conditions under which there are either multiple equilibria, or
the equilibrium is indeterminate. In our analysis, we examine how the determinacy
and uniqueness of equilibria depend on the relative advantage of trucks over cars in
collision with cars or with other trucks, and on the quality-adjusted cost differential
between SUVs and cars.
The U.S. passenger-vehicle ﬂeet has shifted markedly from cars to light trucks; the
percentage of the registered ﬂeet composed of light trucks has risen from about 18%
in 1975 to around 35% in 2000. Studies have estimated that much of that shift was
a result of fuel-economy regulation (CAFE standards) that is stricter for cars than for
light trucks, yielding an implicit subsidy on light truck production. Once the subsidy
shifted some purchases away from cars to light trucks, the relative safety beneﬁt of
purchasing a light truck went up, spurring a sort of automotive arms race constrained
by heterogeneous preferences over types of motor vehicles.
It is likely that the shift in ﬂeet composition has been exacerbated by the incentive
for defensive purchasing. It is also likely that innovations in fuel-economy regulation
or vehicle-aggressivity standards will alter the ﬂeet mix, and that defensive purchasing
can make the nature of that change difﬁcult to predict. We use our model to examine
the extent to which the arms-race effect is an important factor in the current market
for motor vehicles. In particular, we focus on the impact of aggressivity standards
(such as the voluntary standards recently agreed upon by the motor-vehicle industry,
which would impose design alterations, such as lowered bumpers and crumple zones,
to SUVs that reduce the expected damage to other vehicle involved in collisions).
In contrast to many existing studies of motor vehicle policy and vehicle choice (e.g.
Bento and Goulder, 2003), our model is extremely simple and has only a few parame-
ters. Nevertheless, our study demonstrates that motor-vehicle policy analysis is likely
3to reach qualitatively different conclusions if one neglects to incorporate defensive
purchasing into the analysis. In particular, we demonstrate that given current vehicle
design, it is important to consider consumers’ beliefs about vehicle safety in their ve-
hicle choice decisions. Additionally, given the current ﬂeet mix, defensive purchasing
and the nature of the driving externality may mean that any change in motor vehicle
policy has an unexpectedly large or small impact on ﬂeet mix.
2 Background and literature review
Motor vehicle regulation has long been a topic of study by economists and policy
analysts. Debate over the effects of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) stan-
dards has raged since they were established as part of the Energy Policy and Conserva-
tionAct of1975. Theirintroductionwas drivenbynational securityconcernstriggered
by the OPEC embargoes, and by fears that world oil reserves were dangerously close
to exhaustion. Those concerns have largely faded in recent years. However, CAFE
standards remain in the policy limelight because of new concerns over the contribu-
tion of mobile-source carbon emissions to climate change and to urban air pollution
problems. In addition, the increased popularity of light trucks has led federal regula-
tors and the auto industry to consider whether such vehicles should be subject to safety
standards designed to reduce the damage they cause to other vehicles in multi-vehicle
accidents. As we shall see, these policy problems are closely inter-related.
Separate CAFE standards have been maintained for cars and light trucks, and for
domestic- and foreign-made vehicles. Light trucks are deﬁned for the purposes of this
regulatory program as any vehicle under 8500 pounds that is not a “car,” including
minivans, small pickup trucks, and sport-utility vehicles (SUVs). Light-truck stan-
dards were phased in several years after the standards for cars, and have been much
less stringent in every year of the program. While the standard for domestic passenger
cars has gone from 18 mpg in 1978 to 27.5 mpg in 1996, the standard for domestic
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monic mean of the certiﬁed fuel efﬁciency (in miles per gallon) of the vehicles sold
in a given category (like domestic cars) by each manufacturer must be greater than or
equal to the standards. Any manufacturer who fails this test is liable for extremely
large ﬁnes.
An early set of studies attempted to ascertain the potential and actual effects of
CAFE on fuel economy, vehicle-miles traveled, and fuel use. This included work
by Kleit (1990), Greene (1990, 1992), Greene, Kahn, and Gibson (1999). In gen-
eral, these papers found that while consumers respond to increasing fuel economy
by increasing the numbers of miles that they drive, the program did increase the fuel
efﬁciency of new cars and reduce fuel use by those vehicles. However, these studies
neglected to consider light trucks. Given that such vehicles were a relatively small part
of the market during the 1980s, this focus was understandable. However, the market
has changed since CAFE was put in place. The ratio of new car to new light truck
sales has fallen from 2.16:1 in 1986 to .93:1 in 2002 (Automotive News, 2003), and
the percentage of the registered ﬂeet composed of light trucks has risen from about
18% in 1975 to around 32% in 1995 (US DOT, 1995).
A second body of work has analyzed the effect of CAFE on new-vehicle ﬂeet
composition, making clear that these changes have hindered the ability of CAFE to
improve average new-vehicle fuel efﬁciency. Thorpe (1997) points out that the av-
erage fuel economy of new vehicles, including light trucks, leveled out in the mid
1980s and has actually fallen since 1987. He uses a computable general equilibrium
model of the industry to illustrate that this may well be because the relative vehicle
prices encouraged by CAFE have stimulated several shifts in new-vehicle purchases
from more to less fuel efﬁcient vehicles, including from cars to light trucks. Yun’s
empirical work (1997) on national demand for new cars and trucks supports Thorpe’s
case, ﬁnding that CAFE has increased the demand for light trucks and decreased the
demand for cars.
5A third vein of research has focused on the effects of CAFE on motor-vehicle
safety. Traditional work in this area rests heavily on a few key stylized “facts.” First,
fuel efﬁciency and vehicle weight have typically been viewed as strong substitutes
(Crandall et al., 1986.) Second, safety analysts have emphasized that as vehicle weight
rises, the risk to the vehicle’s occupants of injury and death is reduced. Crandall
and Graham (1989) outline the literature that has developed that school of thought,
emphasizing the work of Evans (1982, 1984). Given these asserted links, Crandall and
Graham (1989) conclude that CAFE will signiﬁcantly raise the rate of motor-vehicle
fatalities in new cars by forcing manufacturers to lower the average weight of cars.
Crandall and Graham’s work, like Greene’s, excludes light-trucks from the scope
of the study. That exclusion, however, may have been important to their results. Godek
(1997) claims that the shift toward light trucks (seemingly caused by CAFE) should
work to ameliorate about 75% of any negative effect on safety of the reduction of the
average weight of cars. Substitution from cars to light trucks may prevent CAFE from
achieving its stated goal, but Godek takes comfort in the conclusion that at least drivers
are safer for it.
Yet, is overall motor-vehicle safety really enhanced by increasing the fraction of
light trucks in the ﬂeet? The traditional view of motor vehicle safety does imply that
the sheer weight of these vehicles conveys safety beneﬁts to their occupants. However,
vehicles that protect their own occupants may exert large negative safety externalities
on the drivers of other vehicles. Gayer (2004) ﬁnds that, while a driver is .29-.69 times
as likely to die in a given crash if she is driving a truck instead of a car driver, a light-
truck driver is 1.48-2.63 times as likely to kill the opposing driver as is the driver of a
car. In a related study, White (2002) ﬁnds that drivers replace cars with light trucks,
an additional 3,700 crashes occur per year involving fatalities of smaller-vehicle occu-
pants, cyclists, and pedestrians, while only 1,400 fatalities in light trucks are avoided.
Some insurance companies have begun to raise liability insurance rates on SUVs and
pickups precisely because they inﬂict unusually expensive damage on cars (and car
6occupants) in collisions (Bradsher, 1997). However, even if this practice becomes
widespread, it is unlikely to cause owners of SUVs and pickups to internalize these
costs, since features of the legal system surrounding motor-vehicle-accident liability
prevent insurance companies and their clients from having to reimburse accident vic-
tims and their families for the true damages associated with an accident (Posner, 1977,
p. 154.) Regulatory and physical differences between cars and light trucks cause
problems for public policy and social welfare. The ability to shift into light trucks
emasculates CAFE’s ability to achieve its goal of improving the fuel efﬁciency of new
vehicles in the ﬂeet. At the same time, the presence of large numbers of light trucks
on the road imposes potentially large safety externalities on the drivers of traditional
cars. The externality problem provides new-vehicle buyers with an added incentive to
buy light trucks instead of cars, since most drivers that happen to be in a two-vehicle
accident would rather be driving the vehicle that “wins.” These incentives push the
ﬂeet even further toward vehicles with high levels of air-pollution emissions per mile
driven.
Recent work seeks to construct more sophisticated models to analyze the effects
of automobile policies (e.g. Bento and Goulder, 2003). However, these models have
not yet incorporated defensive purchasing into their frameworks. In this paper, we
take a different approach to consumer choice of vehicles that focuses speciﬁcally on
defensive purchasing.
3 Theoretical model
Consider a system with a unit continuum of consumers, each purchasing exactly
one motor vehicle. For simplicity, we assume that there are only two types of vehicle,
‘cars’ and ‘trucks’, where both light trucks and SUVs are considered to be trucks. The
two vehicle types are assumed to have different qualities based on consumer percep-
tions of physical attributes such as comfort and performance. We assume that trucks
7represent a higher quality of good than cars.
Each consumer chooses the vehicle type that maximizes their net utility of owner-
ship, including the expected disutility of dying or being seriously injured in a motor-
vehicle accident. Driving imposes an externality on all other users. Externalities are
asymmetric, sothattheexternalitycosttoconsumersdependsbothontheirownchoice
of vehicle and on the choices of other consumers.
Deﬁne the proportion of trucks in the vehicle ﬂeet as θ, the quality-adjusted cost of
trucks as xt, and the quality-adjusted cost of cars as xc. We assume that as the higher
quality good, trucks will have the higher cost, so that xt > xc.
Vehicle ownership and use entails the risk of accidents. In any two vehicle colli-
sion, the probability of death will depend on the type of each vehicle involved in the
collision. Deﬁne Pij as the disutility (the conditional probability of death in a two-car
accident multiplied by the value of life) for the occupant of a vehicle of type i involved
in an accident with a vehicle of type j. Note that the monetized disutility from one-car
accidents is exogenous to the ﬂeet mix and can be included, without loss of generality,
in the quality-adjusted cost terms. As trucks weigh more and are more aggressively
designed than cars, it is assumed that Pit > Pic and Pcj > Ptj for i,j ∈ {c,t}.
The ﬁrst inequality states that for drivers of a particular vehicle type, the probability
of dying is greater in a collision with a truck than with a car. The second inequality
states that for a collision with a particular vehicle type, the probability of dying in
two-vehicle accidents is greater for car drivers than truck drivers.
The expected disutility of owning a vehicle is thus given by xi+Pitθ+Pic(1−θ),
where i ∈ {c,t}. In order to have an equilibrium vehicle ﬂeet with both cars and
trucks, consumers must be indifferent between cars and trucks. This implies that
xc + Pctθ + Pcc(1 − θ) = xt + Pttθ + Ptc(1 − θ) (1)
Equation (1) is an extremely simpliﬁed view of vehicle choice. In this model,
we have assumed that consumers are homogeneous in their underlying preferences
8across vehicle types. However, the analysis for heterogeneous consumers would be
broadly similar. In that case, some consumers would always prefer cars, some would
always prefer trucks, and the remainder would still be faced with the decision in (1).
Additionally, note that we have assumed a static system. Thus, population is constant,
and any consumer deaths are exactly replaced by new consumers. Similarly, we ignore
scrappage.
Rearranging (1) gives a condition for an interior solution of θ:
θ =
(xt − xc) − (Pcc − Ptc)
(Pct − Ptt) − (Pcc − Ptc)
, θ ∈ (0,1) (2)
Deﬁne the quality-adjusted cost differential, (xt − xc) as C. The quality-adjusted
cost differential may be thought of as representing the difference in price between
trucksandcarsremainingonceallthequalitydifferenceshavebeentakenintoaccount.
Similarly, deﬁne the relative advantage of trucks in a collision with cars, (Pcc − Ptc),
as X, and the relative advantage of trucks in a collision with trucks, (Pct −Ptt), as Y .






, θ ∈ (0,1) (3)
Note that based on our deﬁnitions, C, X, and Y , and thus C
X and Y
X, are all strictly
positive. Based on the relative values of the three parameters C, X, and Y , the param-
eter space of { C
X, Y
X} can be divided into seven regions. In each of these regions, the
equilibrium mix of cars and trucks will be different.
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Indeterminate, θ ∈ [0,1].
Proofs for the equilibrium types and stability are given in the Appendix.
10Once again, note that if we had modeled consumers as heterogeneous, corner so-
lutions would still exist. In this case, they would represent regions of parameter space
for which no consumer is indifferent between cars and trucks. Interior solutions would
represent regions of parameter space for which some consumers are indifferent be-
tween cars and trucks.
4 Analysis
In order to analyze possible implications of motor vehicle policy, we need to deﬁne
the set of parameters Pij, i,j ∈ {c,t}, for the current vehicle ﬂeet mix. Two-vehicle
crash statistics may be obtained from data in White (2002) and Gayer (2004). In
this analysis, we ignore one-vehicle crashes, as they constitute less than one-tenth the
number of two-vehicle crashes (White, 2002).
Table 2. Two-vehicle crash statistics.
Vehicle type Car Truck Total
Car 1,864,727 1,474,022 3,338,749
Truck 1,474,022 372,198 1,944,831
Given that there are approximately 130,000,000 cars and 67,500,000 light trucks
registered, we can obtain the annual crash rate of cars in two-vehicle accidents as
0.026 and of light trucks as 0.029. The numbers in Table 2 may be combined with
data reported in Gayer (2004) to give approximate fatality rates by vehicles involved
in collision, where values in Table 3 show the probability that a driver of vehicle type
i, conditional on being involved in a collision with a vehicle type j, dies:
11Table 3. Conditional fatality probabilities.
Vehicle type j = Car j = Truck
i = Car 0.0058 0.012
i = Truck 0.0030 0.0074
Combining the data in Table 3 with the annual crash rate and a value of statisti-
cal life of $3 million (in the middle of the range suggested by Dreyfus and Viscusi
(1995)) gives the annual disutilities of each type of accident for drivers of vehicle type
i involved in collisions with vehicles of type j:
Table 4. Disutilities resulting from the different types of two-vehicle collision.
Vehicle type j = Car j = Truck
i = Car 450 930
i = Truck 261 630
Now, for these values of Pij, Y
X = 1.59. From Table 1, it is clear that current
vehicle design does not fall within Region 1 of the parameter space of Y
X and C
X.
The current value of θ, the proportion of trucks on the road, is 0.34 (White, 2002).
If we assume that this represents an equilbrium, we can solve for the implicit value
C
X, which, assuming the same $3 million value of statistical life, is $227 annually.
Hence, if the current ﬂeet mix given by θ = 0.34 is an equilbrium, then from Table 1,
12it must be an unstable one, as Y = $300. This represents the quality-adjusted price
differential between trucks and cars. With a discount rate of 5% and a vehicle life of 8
years, this corresponds to a net present value of the difference of over $1500.
Using the results from Tables 1 and 4, we can now consider the policy implications
of a motor vehicle policy that reduces the aggressivity of light trucks in comparison to
cars. The parameter Y
X is a measure of the aggressivity, in collisions with cars, of light
trucks when compared to cars. The current value of Y
X is 1.58, and that of C
X is 1.20.
This means that if the relative aggressivity of trucks were lowered to 1.20, the all truck
equilibrium would no longer be stable. For values of Y
X less than 1.20, the only stable
solution is an equilibrium with cars only. Thus, if defensive purchasing is important
to conusmer vehicle choice, it may be possible to effect a large change in ﬂeet mix
through a relatively small change in truck aggresivity. Existing studies do not take
defensive purchasing into account at all; these studies would predict no change at all
from a change in truck aggressivity. A side effect of changes in truck aggressivity that
reduce the proportion of trucks on the road is a reduction in motor vehicle air pollution
and an increase in ﬂeet average fuel economy.
However, it is also important to consider that small changes in parameters may not
change the equilibrium ﬂeet mix, particularly if the equilibrium is a corner solution
for the distribution of preferences. We hope to explore these interactions in a dynamic
setting in future research.
5 Conclusion
We present a simple theoretical model of consumers’ vehicle choice when the
decision includes the expected disutility of dying in a motor-vehicle accident. Because
fatality risks depend both on the vehicle one drives and the vehicles everyone else
drives, expected disutility depends on the ﬂeet mix at any given time. We show that
SUVs and light trucks impose a signiﬁcant negative externality on car drivers. For
13current vehicle designs and fatality data, our analysis reveals the possibility of multiple
equilibria of ﬂeet mix. In such situations, changes in government policy may have
unexpectedly large or non-existent effects on the mix of cars and SUVs in the ﬂeet.
Thus, public policy analyses need to take defensive purchasing behavior into account
in order to predict correctly the effects of changes in motor vehicle regulations.
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157 Appendix
In order to demonstrate equilibrium types and stability, we introduce the following
lemmas:
Lemma 1 (Existence of all-car equilibria) Equilibria with θ = 0 can only exist if
C
X ≥ 1.
Proof: For an equilibrium in which all consumers drive cars to exist, cars must be
preferred to trucks when θ = 0. From equation (1), this implies that xc + Pcc ≤
xt + Ptc. Rearranging gives Pcc − Ptc ≤ xt − xc and X ≤ C. Hence, C
X ≥ 1.k
Lemma 2 (Stability of all-car equilibria) (i) If C
X > 1, equilibria at θ = 0 will be
stable.
(ii) If C
X = 1, equilibria at θ = 0 will be stable if Y
X ≤ 1.
Proof: (i) If C
X > 1, then xc +Pcc < xt +Ptc, so no consumer has an incentive to buy
a truck, and the equilibrium is stable.
(ii) If C
X = 1, then consumers are indifferent between trucks and cars at θ = 0.
Consider a small ε > 0 and a ﬂeet mix ε. A ﬂeet mix with more trucks than ε will be
preferred if ε(Pct − Pcc) > ε(Ptt − Ptc). Rearranging and eliminating ε gives the
condition Pct − Ptt > Pcc − Ptc, which simpliﬁes to Y
X > 1. Thus, the equilibrium is
unstable if Y
X > 1 and stable if Y
X ≤ 1.k




Proof: For an equilibrium in which all consumers drive trucks to exist, trucks must be
preferred to cars when θ = 1. From equation (1), this implies that xc+Pct ≥ xt+Ptt.
Rearranging gives Pct − Ptt ≥ xt − xc and Y ≥ C. Hence, Y
X ≥ C
X.k
Lemma 4 (Stability of all-truck equilibria) (i) If Y
X > C




X, equilibria at θ = 1 will be stable if Y
X ≤ 1.
16Proof: (i) If Y
X > C
X, then xc + Pct > xt + Ptt, so no consumer has an incentive to
buy a car, and the equilibrium is stable.
(ii) If Y
X = C
X, then consumers are indifferent between trucks and cars at θ = 1.
Consider a small ε > 0 and a ﬂeet mix (1−ε). A ﬂeet mix with less trucks than (1−ε)
will be preferred if −ε(Pct − Pcc) < −ε(Ptt − Ptc). Rearranging and eliminating
ε gives the condition Pct − Ptt > Pcc − Ptc, which simpliﬁes to Y
X > 1. Thus, the
equilibrium is unstable if Y
X > 1 and stable if Y
X ≤ 1.k
Lemma 5 (Stability of interior equilibria) Interior equilibria will be stable if Y
X ≤
1.
Proof: To see whether an interior equilibrium θ ∈ (0,1) is stable, consider small
ε > 0 and a ﬂeet mix (θ+ε). A ﬂeet mix with more trucks than θ+ε will be preferred
if ε(Pct − Pcc) > ε(Ptt − Ptc). Rearranging and eliminating ε gives the condition
Pct−Ptt > Pcc−Ptc, which simpliﬁes to Y
X > 1. Similarly, a ﬂeet mix with less trucks
than θ−ε will be preferred if −ε(Pct−Pcc) < −ε(Ptt−Ptc), and this condition also
simpliﬁes to Y
X > 1. Thus, interior equilibria will be stable if Y
X ≤ 1.k
These lemmas and the relative values of C,X, and Y can then be used to demon-
strate the existence and stability of equilibria in each of the seven parameter spaces.
Region 1. If 1 > C
X > Y
X then a solution to (3), θ ∈ (0,1) exists, so an interior
equilibrium is possible. By Lemma 5, this equilibrium is stable, as Y
X < 1. By Lem-
mas 1 and 3, corner solutions can not exist.
Region 2. If Y
X > C
X then no solution to (3) exists in (0,1), and no interior equilib-
rium is possible. If Y
X = C
X, θ = 1 solves (3) and no interior equilibrium is possible.
By Lemma 1, no all-car equilibrium can exist. By Lemmas 3 and 4, the all-truck equi-
librium exists and is stable.
17Region 3. If C
X ≥ 1 > Y
X or C
X > Y
X ≥ 1, then no solution to (3) exists in (0,1),
and no interior equilibrium is possible. By Lemmas 1 and 2, the all-car equilibrium
exists and is stable. By Lemma 3, no all-truck equilibrium exists.
Region 4. If Y
X > C
X > 1 then a solution to (3) exists in (0,1), so an interior
equilibrium is possible. By Lemma 5, this equilibrium is unstable. By Lemmas 1 and
2, the all-car equilibrium exists and is stable. By Lemmas 3 and 4, the all-truck equi-
librium exists and is stable.
Region 5. If Y
X = C
X > 1 then no solution to (3) exists in (0,1), so an interior
equilibrium is not possible. By Lemma 3 and (3), an equilibrium with θ = 1 exists,
but by Lemma 4, it is not stable. By Lemmas 1 and 2, the all-car equilibrium exists
and is stable.
Region 6. If Y
X > C
X = 1 then no solution to (3) exists in (0,1), so an interior
equilibrium is not possible. By Lemma 1 and (3), an equilibrium with θ = 0 exists,
but by Lemma 2, it is not stable. By Lemmas 3 and 4, the all-truck equilibrium exists
and is stable.
Region 7. If Y
X = C
X = 1, the system is indeterminate and every value of θ ∈ [0,1]
is an equilibrium.
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